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Introduction
Around the year 874 the first Scandina-
vian settlers landed on the shores of Iceland. Ice-
landers have depended heavily on the ocean
for livelihood, culture, diet, and national iden-
tity ever since. An integral part of Iceland’s
history is the ancient belief in fish as a gift
sent from the gods, free for all to make use of.
It is even written into the Icelandic constitution
that the resources of the sea are the property
of the nation’s people. Throughout most of
the twentieth century, the fishing industry
was consistently the backbone of the econ-
omy. And by 2007, Iceland was the world’s four-
teenth largest fishing nation. ("Icelandic Fish-
eries in Figures 2008," p. 6) With a population
of just 320,000 citizens, Iceland’s 1.8 percent
share of the world catch represents a percent-
age nearly 380 times greater than its share of
the world population. 
One of the most pressing issues with respect
to the future of fishing in Iceland surrounds Ice-
land’s recent bid for accession into the Euro-
pean Union. This article addresses the debate of
EU accession through the lens of the fishing
industry. After examining the dynamic evolu-
tion of the Icelandic fishing experience during
the twentieth century, this article discusses
the challenges posed by Iceland’s potential EU
entrance. It argues that due to the bleak outlook
for European fisheries, Icelandic interests would
be better served by remaining outside the EU in
order to continue its successful management of
its own fishing resources.
Global Exploitation
As the modern era began, little was known
about the oceans, especially their capacity to
support the consumption needs of a burgeon-
ing global population. With time, concerns
increasingly arose regarding the sustainability
of this vast resource. Perhaps the concern that
gained the most worldwide acclaim was Garrett
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” concept that
freedom to use a common resource eventually
ruins it unless human behavior is altered.
With respect to the oceans, he held that “pro-
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fessing to believe in the ‘inexhaustible resources
of the oceans,’ [humans] bring species after
species of fish and whales closer to extinc-
tion.” (Hardin, p. 1245) Indeed, in the years
since he introduced the idea in 1968, biodiver-
sity of the seas has, as he predicted, suffered
in many regions as fishermen exploited fish-
ing stocks to dangerously low levels. With rapid
advances in technology and a worldwide pro-
liferation of government subsidies for fishing,
increased fishing effort has only exacerbated this
global exploitation and led to overfishing.1
Because of the increased costs associated with
decreasing stocks and increased effort, fisheries,
especially in Europe, are now witnessing many
vessels operating at or near a loss, threatening
whole industries. Exacerbating this vicious cycle
of too many boats chasing too few fish, fisher-
men are tempted to cheat the rules simply to
get by. The tragedy of the commons is not
unique to any one country or region; Iceland
has historically come face to face with this
ecologic threat.
1952: Iceland on the Offensive
The period 1945-1967 is generally referred
to as the Golden Years in Iceland because of
the substantial expansion of the herring fishery.
During this time, herring became the most
important catch of the pelagic fishery (i.e. those
fish that live in the water columns as opposed
to demersal fish, which live on or near the
bottom). Due to increased demand, the opening
of new markets, and increased capacity thanks
to innovative technology, herring fishermen
enjoyed decades of good fortune as the catch
increased dramatically, especially in the later
years. As this happened, the spawning stock bio-
mass, the total weight of all mature fish in the
population, declined precipitously from a level
of approximately 14 million metric tons (mmt)
in 1950 to barely 2.5 mmt in 1965. That level
cascaded further to a few hundred thousand
metric tons in 1967. Meanwhile, the fishing
mortality rate rose from a level of 0.1 in 1960 to
well above 1.0 in 1967, meaning more fish were
being caught or dying than were present at
the beginning of the fishing season. (Ministry of
Fisheries and Agriculture)
As the stock and subsequent herring
catches collapsed (Figure 1), the nation fell into
an economic depression. As a result, the pre-
viously untouched capelin rapidly took over as
the dominant fish of the pelagic fleet. In addi-
tion, the less-efficient demersal fishery, most
notably cod, became more important as the fleet
attempted to make up for the reduced catch
in the herring fishery. (Nielsen et al., p. 10) It
quickly became apparent that Iceland needed to
act fast to protect its most valuable natural
resource. 
Increased global demand and new high-
volume fishing techniques threatened the del-
icate natural system of supply. It became evident
that the fish in the sea were indeed exhaustible
after all. In response to this predicament, Ice-
land came to the forefront of an international
effort to reverse this depletion. Due to its size,
the country had no other choice than to inter-
vene against competing nations to protect the
foundation of the economy. As was common
practice among coastal countries, Iceland’s plen-
tiful offshore resources were being collectively
utilized by foreign fishing fleets. Defying inter-
national norms, Iceland embarked on a series of
unilateral decisions to protect its most valued
industry. Although conservationist sentiments
played a role in the initial actions, Iceland’s
efforts were largely motivated by political and
economic matters. 
In May of 1952, Iceland made its first
move to gain more control over its fishing
domain by instituting a four-mile limit on
fishing off its shores, barring foreign competi-
tors. Other countries with interests in Icelandic
waters countered that there was no reasonable
proof of overfishing. An especially infuriated
Great Britain retorted that claiming exclusive
rights over a common area of fishing was a
brash and unjustifiable move.
The ensuing decades were filled with a
succession of Icelandic unilateral decisions and
British retaliatory responses as the two coun-
tries engaged in what came to be known as
the cod wars. With each successive extension of
Iceland’s fishing limits, tensions erupted into
conflict of varying degrees. When the first
1
In this article, overfishing means the adult spawn-
ing population is depleted to a level where it can no longer
replenish the population fast enough, annual harvests
become increasingly smaller, and profitability of a fishery is
suboptimal Overfishing: A Global Disaster
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United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Seas (UNCLOS I) failed in 1958 to reach inter-
national consensus on fishing limits, Iceland
simply continued pushing the boundaries—to
12 miles in 1958 and again to 50 in 1972. The
final extension to 200 miles became effective on
October 15, 1975. (Mitchell, p. 128) UNCLOS
III, which concluded in 1982, officially estab-
lished the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) for all nations, granting the adjacent
nation exclusive rights over the natural
resources within that zone. 
Throughout the cod wars, the British Royal
Navy was forced to escort British fishing vessels
into Icelandic waters to protect them from
Icelandic Coast Guard ships, which had resorted
to cutting British nets. On one occasion, ten-
sions escalated to such a point that the Icelandic
Coast Guard ended up ramming British
trawlers. Such aggressive actions were unprece-
dented within the global fishing industry. While
relations with the rest of Europe deteriorated,
Iceland became internally unified. With the via-
bility of their most important industry at stake,
the consensus of the Icelandic people was that
their actions were necessary. The actions would
soon prove justified, as Iceland developed into
arguably one of the worldwide leaders in marine
conservation efforts.
The 1970s and 1980s: Decades of
Experimentation
In 1975, Iceland’s Marine Research Insti-
tute report on the state of its fish stocks had
an enormous effect on the industry. The “black
report” revealed a cod stock in jeopardy of col-
lapse, facing a fate similar to that of herring only
a few years earlier. (Eythórsson, p. 484) Hav-
ing rid its waters of foreign competition not
many years earlier, Iceland believed its fleet
would be free to enjoy increased catch and
improved profitability. Biologic limitations told
a different story. It was now the cod fishery
witnessing a decline in spawning stock biomass
from nearly one mmt in 1955 to less than 0.25
mmt by 1967, while fishing mortality grew from
0.3 to 0.8. (Ministry of Fisheries and Agricul-
ture) The Icelandic government responded in
1976 by placing a total allowable catch (TAC)
restriction on cod to limit fishing effort, the
entrance of new vessels, and ultimately the
number of cod landed.
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Figure 1
Catch of Cod, Herring, and Capelin in Icelandic Fishing Grounds
1945-2009
From 1976 until 1983, little improve-
ment was seen; the cod catch continued to
increase. In fact, the fleet capacity actually grew,
from about 97,000 gross register tons (GRT)
in 1975 to about 111,000 GRT in 1984. The fleet
capacity increased because of switching from
herring industries, which required larger ves-
sels. Between 1977 and 1981, the number of
days per year that deep-sea trawlers were
allowed to fish for cod decreased from 323 to
215. (Runolfsson, p. 3) Nevertheless, the spawn-
ing stock biomass never rose above 0.5 mmt for
the rest of the decade. 
Around the world, fisheries were constantly
plagued with overfishing due to common prop-
erty issues. The average fishery was not even
profitable. Iceland was no exception. When
foreign vessels were allowed in Icelandic waters,
a management system was largely unenforce-
able. After instituting the 200-mile EEZ, how-
ever, Icelandic officials concluded that the
prolonged decline in Iceland’s fisheries needed
to be put to an end. The Fisheries Association
organized an annual Fisheries Assembly that
involved all of the major unions, organizations,
and related sectors of Iceland’s fishing industry.
The Assembly had been put in place to address
the issues and debates surrounding the drastic
changes to the structure of the industry. In
1983, the Assembly was a crucial force in the
passing of the Fisheries Management Act, giv-
ing the Ministry of Fisheries the task of imple-
menting a vessel quota system. Despite some
opposition within the Association, the desper-
ate condition of the cod stocks demanded action.
Conflicts among internal vested stakeholders
were put aside as the nation unified against a
common threat. The Icelandic government was
trusted to establish a system and allocate quo-
tas in an unbiased manner. The Ministry fol-
lowed through, allocating vessel quotas based
on catch totals over the previous three years.
(Eythórsson, p. 485) 
While it appeared reasonable at first, this
distribution was effectively biased, rewarding
those who started the problem in the first
place by allocating them the largest shares of
the TAC. The system’s ineffectiveness can be
attributed to a few shortcomings and the pres-
ence of loopholes. An effort quota, designed to
protect those owners who may have been inac-
tive in the previous three years, became an
easily exploitable avenue for fishermen who
chose not to involve themselves in the quota
system or who were unsatisfied with their share
of the TAC. It allowed formerly ineligible fish-
ermen to have a part in the quota distribu-
tion. Furthermore, the failure to place small
boat owners under any restrictions essentially
exempted them from any oversight. As a result,
the number of registered small boats (up to
10 GRT) jumped from 964 in 1984 to 1956 by
1990 and their share of the total cod catch
increased from 4% to 14%. (Eythórsson, p. 486)
The Ministry of Fisheries’ vision of reducing
fishing effort was being easily outmaneuvered
because of the complex loopholes put in place.
The 1990s: A Nation Divided
The process of establishing an effective
system followed no linear path in Iceland.
Control over its fishing resources had been
achieved, but the 1980s came to an end with a
bleak outlook for the management system.
The numerous loopholes caused the policies
to fall short. Fishermen continued to pursue
their own personal interests. Fishing effort con-
tinued to expand and annual catches continued
to exceed quotas. For many stakeholders, the
system represented only a temporary fix until
a more robust solution could be found. Because
of the uncertainty surrounding the permanence
of this system, the quotas were not accepted
as collateral and quota transfers were chal-
lenging.
As more effort and resources were put
forth and as more stakeholders played a role
in making decisions, it became evident that this
initial system was evolving into a permanent
structure. Reflecting this new reality, the study
of fisheries economics in Iceland shifted to
increased focus on industry-wide economic effi-
ciency rather than solely natural resource
protection. The 1980s were a decade charac-
terized by subdued internal divisions because of
the common outside pressures brought forth by
collapsing fish stocks. In contrast, the 1990s wit-
nessed a more energetic environment as inter-
ested parties were pulled into the debate and
internal politics played a more significant role.
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The aforementioned developments set the
stage for the 1990 Fisheries Management Act,
establishing an effective and permanent system
of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in the
fishing industry. (Eythórsson, p. 486) Political
dissension within the Fisheries Assembly had
grown since the 1983 Act and the debate had
spilled over into the Parliament and the general
public. This time around, research in fisheries
economics played a major role, advocating a sys-
tem that would provide more flexibility and cer-
tainty for long-term planning and incentives for
efficient use of capital and resources by the
industry as a whole. The new management
system sought to turn a vast overexploited fish-
ery into a tightly monitored resource with
emphasis on long-term sustainability and eco-
nomic optimization. The Ministry of Fisheries’
vision finally began to materialize: the newly
established ITQ system created a profitable fish-
ing industry.
Theoretic Justification for the ITQ 
System
The ITQs created property rights to shares
of a strictly limited total catch. Anthony Scott,
a pioneer of fisheries economics, describes
four main characteristics that have become
the basis for discussion about the efficiency of
such property-rights-based systems: security,
permanence, exclusivity, and transferability. The
degree of fulfillment of these characteristics dic-
tates the extent to which incentives for indi-
vidual behavior will be aligned properly with the
overall long-term optimization of the resource.
(Scott, pp. 19-20) How does Iceland’s system
rate regarding these four characteristics? 
Security, the quality of the title, refers to
the probability that an owner will be able to hold
onto the property right without it being chal-
lenged or diluted. Iceland has done extremely
well in establishing the quotas as secure
resources. For example, in a few Norwegian fish-
eries, new vessels that join the fleet are allocated
quotas, reducing the quota shares of existing
vessels. (Arnason, "Property...," p. 254) This does
not occur in Iceland, conferring a high degree
of security.
Permanence, the duration of possession,
becomes important in investment decisions that
may take a long time to pay off. This has been
an area of struggle for Iceland. The initial
1983 allocation and subsequent structural
changes in 1990 raise questions about the per-
manence of such a system. While ITQs in Ice-
land’s system represent a property right to a
share of the catch each year, the laws state
that these rights are of indefinite duration.
(Arnason, "Property...," p. 252) Because the laws
do not establish rights that are explicitly in per-
petuity, vessel owners are granted less certainty
for investment decisions. 
Exclusivity, the ability to capture the full
value of one’s property without intervention,
provides incentives for owners to reduce costs
and maximize returns. Whereas permanence
relates to the ability to make long-term invest-
ment decisions regarding property, exclusivity
involves being able to realize and capture the
total gains from holding the property. With
regards to exclusivity, Iceland has also per-
formed well. The Icelandic government has
worked hard to reduce the amount and the
adverse effects of stringent government regula-
tions. However, two factors in Iceland’s system
have reduced the degree of exclusivity. The first
is the existence of a fee that subtracts slightly
from the element of exclusivity. The fee con-
tributes toward fleet surveillance, system
enforcement, and fisheries research. While it
may be necessary to maintain these collective
benefits of the system, it still represents an out-
side intervention that keeps an individual ves-
sel from realizing the full economic benefit from
its quota. A second factor is that an ITQ repre-
sents an indirect property right on an under-
lying resource. In contrast, a farmer would have
a direct property right on the land on which
he toils. With regards to a fishery, there is
simply less control over the actual fish stocks
and those who may interfere with them. For this
reason, there is a vested interest in supporting
a healthy marine ecosystem when the quality of
property rights is higher for all participants.
When exclusivity is present, an individual ves-
sel can concentrate on maximizing the profits
available to it within its restricted allocation
by improving the quality of the catch and min-
imizing the associated costs.
Transferability, the ease with which a
market can freely move a property right from
seller to buyer, allows participants to enjoy
the returns from their property by allocating the
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right to the most efficient competitor. In this
sense, Iceland fares well. Because quotas can be
bought and sold, they can move readily to those
who will use them most profitably, removing
inefficient vessels from the national fleet.
Because of this, the fishing industry in Iceland
has undergone substantial changes with regards
to its composition and the concentration of pro-
duction. In 1993, 1174 vessel operators were
allocated catch quotas, with the largest ten oper-
ators comprising a 25 percent share of the TAC.
By 2007, the number of vessel operators fell to
762, with the largest ten operators making up
approximately 52 percent of the total catch.
("Icelandic Fisheries in Figures 2008," p. 12)
Transferability also supports conservation
efforts. In addition to TACs capping the amount
harvested in a given year, thereby reducing fluc-
tuations, transferability allows conservationists
to play a direct role in quota markets. If the ben-
efit of saving a specific species outweighs the
profits to a fisherman to harvest that species,
then the ITQ system essentially “moves the fish-
ing versus conservation conflict out of the polit-
ical arena into the realm of the market system.”
(Aranson, “Advances...,” p. 40)
Icelandic Fishing Today
What effect, then, have rights-based fish-
eries had on the industry in Iceland and has the
nation delivered any significant results? Fishing
still has a serious economic impact, although
that has decreased over the past few decades
as the economy diversified. In 2008, fish prod-
ucts accounted for 26 percent of total exports
and 37 percent of merchandise exports, down
from the 1950s peak of 90 percent of mer-
chandise exports. Only recently has fishing’s
contribution to GDP been surpassed by alu-
minum production, a rapidly expanding indus-
try driven by the abundance of Iceland’s clean-
energy resources. Fishing’s contribution to GDP
declined from a peak of 17 percent in 1978 to
8 percent today. Despite seeming a relatively
small component of GDP, Icelanders believe
fishing is the backbone of the economy. (Min-
istry of Fisheries and Agriculture) A 2003 arti-
cle by Sveinn Agnarsson and Ragnar Arnason
explores this paradox. Pointing to forward and
backward linkages to the supporting indus-
tries built up around fishing and the indus-
try’s dominance as a foreign exchange earner,
Agnarsson and Arnason estimated that in the
long run a 1% increase in the value of fishing
production would increase GDP by 0.42%,
suggesting that GDP shares substantially under-
state the importance of fisheries within the Ice-
landic economy. (Agnarsson and Arnason, p. 13)
Similarly, between 1930 and 2008, the
fishing industry’s contribution to employment
declined steadily, from a peak of 23 percent to
4.1 percent. (Ministry of Fisheries and Agri-
culture) However, regional impacts vary widely.
Arguably, much of the criticism of the ITQ
system has materialized out of concern for rural
development and employment in small fishing
towns. Vertical and horizontal integration and
the concentration of quotas have combined in
accelerating the demise of coastal communities,
once the foundation for social organization.
In essence, rights-based fisheries represent a
trade-off between economic efficiency, in which
ecologic sustainability plays a big role, and social
equity, where the benefits often concentrate
to a select few.
Economic Efficiency versus Social
Equity
Even though efficiency and profits have
improved for the firms left standing, many argue
that the associated social costs are not only
difficult to monetize but also not worth it. Poor
communities have been marginalized to such
an extent that employment alternatives remain
severely limited. Moreover, in an environment
characterized by strong, united communities,
the quota allocation has led to an unfair com-
pensation system on a local level. Fishing
communities, because of the forward and back-
ward linkages built around fishing, are often just
as invested in the sustainability of a given
company as the vessel owners. As the industry
consolidates, those owners can sell their quotas
to larger scale operators, receiving a wonder-
ful retirement bundle. The rest of the commu-
nity, meanwhile, gets nothing. This lack of a
safety net for the rest lies at the heart of the Ice-
landic people’s animosity toward the ITQ sys-
tem. 
The real challenges for rural communi-
ties notwithstanding, the increased concentra-
tion of the Icelandic fishing industry should
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be considered on net positive. Even as the ITQ
system has led to consolidation, Arnason asserts
that the property rights are necessary to foster
specialization and accumulation of capital,
two classical sources of economic growth.
(Arnason, "Property...," p. 245) In related work,
Arnason describes how the ITQ has created new
wealth. With quotas both exclusive and trans-
ferable, their market price reflects expected
future profits. Because Iceland’s fishing indus-
try has developed into one characterized by prof-
itable firms, the market value of ITQs in the
approximately 35 different fisheries has
increased from $25 million in 1984 to approx-
imately $4.5 billion by 2005. (Arnason, "Ice-
land's...," p. 37) This newly created wealth can
in turn be used to finance new capital invest-
ments in other industries, providing Iceland the
capability and flexibility to diversify its economy
and expand into other ventures.
The European Market
As Icelanders contemplate joining the EU,
many have come to believe the costs far exceed
the benefits. Concern is particularly high for
fisheries. The importance of the European mar-
ket for Icelandic exports, especially marine prod-
ucts, cannot be overstated. Figure 2 illustrates
the value of marine product exports from Ice-
land in 2007, by trading areas. Clearly, Icelandic
fishing depends on Europe. Unfortunately, the
EU has not enjoyed the success of a proper fish-
eries management system as Iceland has.
Because of this, the Icelandic fishing industry
may be in for a rude awakening if forced to
join the fractured and poorly performing Com-
mon Fisheries Policy.
The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy
The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
was created in 1983 to ease tensions between
coastal nations with competing interests in
the sea. The EU needed rules for managing
one of the most diverse fisheries in the world,
to ensure that all member states had equal
access. With more than 300 pieces of legislation
covering 88,000 vessels, the CFP is undoubtedly
a complex system. Unfortunately, with a focus
on protecting national industries, the EU’s
approach turned out to be shortsighted. Criti-
cal reforms following required decadal reviews
in 1992 and again in 2002 shed light on the leg-
islation’s shortcomings. Original CFP rules had
minimal impact on conservation. In effect,
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Figure 2
Value and Destination of Icelandic Fishing Exports, 2007
enforcement and regulation were brushed aside
as secondary concerns. By sacrificing long-term
ecologic sustainability in favor of short-term
national and social interests, the CFP is essen-
tially undermining the very economic inter-
ests it intended to protect. Thus, the 2002
reform emphasized a more balanced approach
to the sustainable use of natural resources
that incorporated not only social interests but
also economic rationality and environmental
viability. In the 2008 user guide for the CFP, the
European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs
and Fisheries characterized the reforms of 2002
as ushering in a state of “optimistic turmoil.” ("The
Common Fisheries Policy," p. 4) Many initiatives
were taken up, yet many problems still exist.
As the next decadal reform draws closer
in 2012, it has become clear that previous
reforms have had little impact. As of 2007, 29 of
the 33 most important commercial fishing
stocks in Europe, or about 88 percent, were
overfished. ("The Common Fisheries Policy,"
p. 4) The global average of overfished stocks
stands at 25 percent. What contributed to this
dismal record? An EU Green Paper in 2009,
aimed at promoting public debate about the
future of the CFP, pointed to five structural fail-
ures: deep-rooted fleet overcapacity, imprecise
policy objectives resulting in insufficient guid-
ance for decisions and implementation, a deci-
sion-making system that encourages short-term
focus, a framework that does not give suffi-
cient responsibility to the industry, and poor
compliance by the industry coupled with a
lack of political will to ensure compliance.
("Reform...," p. 8) In preparation for the 2012
reform, the Green Paper invited suggestions
from stakeholders. In 2010, the results of this
consultation were released, to be followed by a
legislative proposal in 2011 and reforms imple-
mented by 2013. The following discussion syn-
thesizes the consensus on the major shortcom-
ings of the CFP. 
There is general agreement that no long-
term conflicts exist between ecologic, economic,
and social objectives within the fishing sector.
These objectives clash only in the short term.
("Synthesis...," p. 4) A main hindrance is that the
CFP was designed to allocate a resource per-
ceived as inexhaustible. As a result, overcapac-
ity remains a major problem. The capacity of the
EU fleet is estimated to be twice the available
fish. Even though the number of vessels has
declined about 2% annually for 17 years, the
technologic creep runs at a similar rate, off-
setting efforts to shrink the fleet. ("The Com-
mon Fisheries Policy," p. 19)
At the same time, the industry has been
propped up for decades by generous public sub-
sidies. By one account, the European fishing
industry was paid €3.4 billion in subsidies
between 1994 and 2006. Of this amount, 40%
was for scrapping existing vessels, yet 48%
was directed towards modernization or produc-
tion of new vessels, clearly undermining any
effort to reduce capacity. (Fishsubsidy.org) In
some EU countries, the cost of public subsi-
dies has actually exceeded the total value of
the annual catch. In effect, these national fish-
ing industries have enjoyed free access to a nat-
ural resource while their costs have been picked
up by taxpayers through high subsidies. The
general public is effectively paying for fish twice,
once at the counter and again through taxes.
Overcapacity also creates temptations to cheat
the system, weakening the economic perform-
ance of the entire sector. While a system of
transferable quotas such as Iceland’s may be
an obvious response, European member states
have so far rejected the idea due to concerns
about the effect on small coastal fishing com-
munities. 
Another challenge surrounds policy objec-
tives and decision-making procedures. When
established in 1983, the CFP instituted a prin-
ciple known as relative stability—a member
state's share of the TAC should remain constant
over time. As a result, when catch limits are
set for each species every year, member states
have the incentive to bargain for higher lim-
its. Even though countless resources are put
into recommending an optimal TAC based on
science, the resulting negotiated allocation
has exceeded the recommended TAC by an
annual average of 40% between 2002 and 2007.
("The Common Fisheries Policy," p. 15) This sys-
tem of incentives favors short-term bargain-
ing over long-term management.
In short, as long as European fishing ves-
sels struggle to break even, temptations will not
subside without the right incentives in place.
Quotas will continually be exceeded. Vessel own-
ers will continue to intentionally declare inac-
curately low catch quantities to derive the high-
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est price for their catch. Lastly, fishermen will
continue to discard less desirable fish while at
sea in order to maximize the value of the catch,
seriously damaging the health of future stocks.
With so many European countries experiencing
fiscal pressures, reform becomes an even more
uncertain endeavor. 
Iceland’s Accession to the EU: A Nation
Still Divided
The coming months have the potential to
greatly alter the future of Iceland, in particu-
lar its fishing industry. Proponents of the acces-
sion reference the economic benefits that would
come with Iceland’s participation. In May of
2010, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Exter-
nal Trade Mr. Össur Skarphéðinsson delivered a
speech to Althingi, the national parliament, in
which he declared:
Never before has there been a more
compelling reason to find out what
advantages EU membership holds. We
need stability, we need investment, we
need to create jobs, we need to establish as
reliable and strong a framework as possible
for the labour market and the economy
of our country. The European Union is
controversial, but it is my firm belief that
it is the optimal choice for Iceland in order
to reach these goals as soon as possible. All
things considered, the European Union
has achieved significant success in
ensuring stability through low inflation,
low interest rates, a healthy business
environment and continuous economic
growth… We have brought this boom
and burst economy on ourselves, and we
will also be rid of that if we become a
member of the European Union.
(Skarphéðinsson, p. 5)
Much has happened since that speech.
Europe no longer appears capable of providing
Iceland with either a solution to its economic
woes or the key to reaching its goals. Further-
more, the recovery in Iceland has alleviated
some of the angst felt at the height of the crisis,
turning public favor away from the accession. 
In joining the EU, Iceland would effec-
tively be giving up a functioning and prof-
itable fisheries system to join a broken one. Ice-
land would lose control over its EEZ and be
forced to share its waters with other EU fish-
ing nations. Despite its small size and perhaps
insignificant economic might when it comes to
European matters, the success of the Icelandic
fishing industry is an example that should speak
louder than even the most entrenched European
national interests. 
There is wide support among European
member states for the accession of Iceland
into the EU. National polls within Iceland, how-
ever, tell a different story. In December 2010,
a Gallup survey revealed that 54 percent of
Icelanders disagreed with the statement, “Ice-
land’s future should be as part of the EU,”
compared with 30 percent who agreed. In addi-
tion, 62 percent of those surveyed agreed with
the statement, “Iceland’s interests will be
harmed by the EU’s fishery policy,” compared
with 22 percent who disagreed. Lastly, 52 per-
cent of Icelanders disagreed with the statement,
“Iceland will be able to keep control of its nat-
ural resources” compared with 39 percent
who agreed. ("Iceland and the European Union,"
pp. 7-9) It is still too early to say whether or not
Iceland will be able to retain its current sys-
tem within the context of the EU CFP, but it
does not seem likely. Iceland is simply too small
an economy to overcome the deeply entrenched
interests in Brussels.
Even recently, Iceland has asserted itself
in such an aggressive way that it has received
a negative reaction across Europe. In 2010
and again in 2011, Iceland has unilaterally
expanded its quota of mackerel, sparking a
tension called the mackerel wars. (McFarlane)
For many in Iceland and Europe, the situation
is reminiscent of the cod wars half a century ear-
lier. While Iceland has cited climate change and
new migration patterns into Icelandic waters as
justification for its drastic increase in mack-
erel quota, others point to the negative public
opinion of the EU accession process as an expla-
nation for such an aggressive move. The last
stage of the accession process involves a national
referendum in order for Iceland to officially join
the EU. There has been some belief that Ice-
land’s instigating of the mackerel wars has been
a deliberate move by the Icelandic govern-
ment to anger the European community and
force them to cut off the negotiations. This
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would save the current government from an
embarrassing defeat in a national referendum
and place the accountability for breaking off
negotiations on Europe instead, perhaps a
welcome outcome. For skeptics, the idea of giv-
ing up the full control of the country's most
important natural resource is still unthinkable,
prompting informed observers to conclude that
"negotiations are proceeding but seem increas-
ingly pointless, as accession will almost certainly
be defeated in a referendum.” (Schulz, p. 9)
Conclusion
In the twenty-first century, Iceland has
endured a number of trials that have forced
the nation to reconsider its priorities. The acces-
sion to the EU would only add the fishing indus-
try to the list of victims. As ambitious and
resilient as the Icelandic people are, their hard
work and sacrifice in establishing their ITQ sys-
tem would largely be wasted. A complex, con-
flict-ridden, and heavily subsidized European
fishing industry will most likely devastate the
profitability of the Icelandic industry. The social
concerns of those adversely affected by the
current system would likely be further exacer-
bated if Iceland were to join the EU. Iceland
needs to make sure that it does not lose sight of
the progress it has made when it comes to the
ITQ system. As a rare example of a successful
fisheries management system, Iceland has
succeeded where almost all others continue to
fail. In addition, Icelanders will admit they
still have some ways to go, another testament
to a determined national identity.
With so much speculation surrounding
the upcoming process, the people of Iceland can
only hope for the expected defeat of the referen-
dum so that Iceland remains outside the sphere
of the EU. With fishing still an economic foun-
dation of the country, Iceland would be better
off remaining outside of the EU to continue
maintaining control of its fishing resources in
a sustainable manner.
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